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Henri  Bergson’s  ‘The  Possible  and  the  Real’  was  published  in 
Swedish in  1930 and then in  French in  1934,  and is  based on a 
lecture delivered at the University of Oxford in 1920.1 In the essay, 
Bergson claims that the idea that “the possibility of things precedes 
their existence” [PM 109] is an illusion, a retrospective illusion, for 
our ideas of the possible, once correctly analysed, can be seen to 
arrive only after the fact: “the possible is merely the real with, in 
addition, an act of mind that projects its image into the past once it 
has happened” [PM 110].  The illusion is  not innocuous,  however, 
since  it  occludes  the  novelty  and  originality  of  each  and  every 
moment of experience. If an event was possible before it happened, 
Bergson  argues,  it  would  be  merely  the  realisation  of  a  pre-
determined programme, and nothing genuinely new would happen. 
Ideas that possibility precedes actuality are thus a function of an 
inability to admit “the continual creation of unforeseeable novelty” 
[PM 115].
Bergson insisted that the arguments of this short essay published 
late in his philosophical career are not peripheral or accidental to his 
thinking,  but  rather  central  to  his  philosophy  as  a  whole.2 They 
certainly have been influential. They are of pivotal importance in the 
work of, for example, Gilles Deleuze, and within the recent renewal 
of  interest  in  Bergson’s  thinking  that  Deleuze’s  approach  has 
inspired.  Other  commentators,  however,  have drawn attention  to 
limitations  in  Bergson’s  critique  and  pointed  to  difficulties  in  his 
1 With  the  abbreviation  PM  followed  by  a  page  number  I  refer  to  the  original 
pagination of  La pensée et le mouvant – the 1934 volume in which the essay ‘Le 
possible et le réel’ appeared – which is indicated in Bergson 1959 and Bergson 2009. 
The translations are based on Andison’s in Bergson 1949.
2 See Benrubi 1942:366.
conception of novelty.3 For all  that, Bergson’s critique has seldom 
been subject to critical analysis in relation to traditional conceptions 
of  modality,  and the sources  and significance of  his  ideas about 
novelty  have remained obscure.4 The present  paper  contends,  in 
fact, that Bergson’s critique of possibility and his ideas concerning 
novelty are bound up in his inheritance of a concept of genius. Both 
the critique of prior possibility and the affirmation of novelty are the 
expression of – to use a phrase I will clarify below – a ‘metaphysics 
of genius’, and only in recognising that and how they stand together 
as an episode within the history of the modern concept of genius, I 
argue,  can  they,  and  Bergson’s  philosophy  as  a  whole,  be 
adequately understood.5
The  first  section  of  the  essay  examines  the  specific  sense  of 
modality in question within Bergson’s critique before showing how it 
depends on an idea of genius. Here, and in the following section, it 
will  be  important  to  determine  how  Bergson  responds  to  the 
arguments of Gabriel Séailles in his 1883 Le génie dans l’art.6 The 
second section examines the problems that  Bergson’s  critique of 
prior possibility poses in relation to his earlier work, the ambiguities 
in  his  conception  of  novelty,  and  how  commentators  have 
responded to these problems. The third section, however, addresses 
the  particular  and,  in  fact,  positive conception  of  possibility  that 
Bergson  presents  in  ‘The  Possible  and  the  Real’.  Although  he 
3 See Jankélévitch 1959 [1931]; Chedin 1986; Mullarkey 1999; Gunter 2007.
4 Of the four studies listed above only Chedin 1986 makes a concerted attempt to situate Bergson’s 
critique in relation to traditional conceptions of modality.
5  The present essay thus attempts to contribute to, as Philippe Soulez and Frédéric 
Worms (1997: 282) put  it,  Bergson’s “entrée dans l’histoire”,  his  admission as an 
important  figure  within  the  history  of  philosophy,  which  constitutes  “une  étape 
décisive pour son oeuvre”.
6 Séailles 1883.
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maintains his critique of prior possibility, Bergson advances an idea 
– an idea that is too often neglected in studies of his thought – of the 
‘retroactivity’ or future anteriority of possibility: an event will have 
been possible once it has occurred even though it was not possible 
beforehand. In the final section of the present essay, I argue that 
this  reflection  on  time,  tense  and  modality  represents  a  new 
development in Bergson’s thought that he is, nevertheless, unable 
to develop fully or explicitly precisely because he is tied to an idea 
of genius that he interprets, within the framework of a philosophical 
voluntarism, as a function of the will.
1. Against Prior Possibility: The Idea of Genius
According  to  Bergson,  the  idea  of  possibility,  like  those  of 
nothingness and disorder, belongs to the set of “grand metaphysical 
problems” that are “generally badly posed and that can be solved 
when the statement of the problem is rectified” [PM 104]. If we ask 
about  the  ontological  status  of  the  possible,  or  about  our 
epistemological access to it, whilst presupposing that the possible 
precedes  the  real,  we  will,  Bergson  claims,  create  insoluble 
philosophical problems and obscure the novelty that exists beyond 
the realms of predictable, repetitive events governed by causal law. 
These closed, determined realms are ‘merely an abstraction’ from 
the original truth of “concrete reality” [PM 110], from our life-world; 
the  “system of  science  is  extracted  or  abstracted  from a  whole 
which includes, beyond inert and unorganised matter, organisation” 
[PM  114].  These  claims,  it  should  be  underlined,  derive  from 
Bergson’s earlier work. In his Essai sur les données immédiates de 
la conscience (1889) Bergson had argued that real duration – our 
temporal  experience  –  cannot  be  understood  in  deterministic  or 
mechanical terms, and that no experience is qualitatively identical 
to  another.  Later,  in  L’évolution  créatrice  (1907),  Bergson 
emphasises  the  ideas  of  novelty  and  of  an  open,  unforeseeable 
future, and extends the scope of his claims to the whole of biological 
as well as psychological life.
Instead of  reserving  an idea  of  possibility  for  life  beyond the 
realms of  necessity,  Bergson argues that  if  events  were possible 
“they would be able to be represented in advance; they could be 
thought  before  being  realised”  [PM  110]  and  thus  that  nothing 
genuinely  novel  would  occur  in  the  event.  Bergson  does  little, 
however, to clarify or categorise the particular sense of possibility at 
stake. Even though – and perhaps because – he claims to address an 
idea “immanent to most philosophies” [PM 112], he does not refer 
by  name  to  any  particular  discussion  of  modality.  He  offers  no 
account  of  the  relation  of  representability  or  conceivability  to 
possibility; 7  he  does  not  clarify  whether  representability  or 
conceivability  is  to  be  understood  in  an  imagistic  sense,  as  a 
function  of  the  imagination;  and  nor  does  he  distinguish  merely 
logical  possibility  –  the  absence  of  logical  inconsistency  –  from 
metaphysical or physical (nomological) possibility.8 Nevertheless, at 
least the primary focus of his critique is clear: this is the paradigm of 
modality as alternative simultaneous possibilities that emerged in 
the 12th century as a result of difficulties in reconciling Aristotle’s 
‘statistical’  paradigm of modality with the Christian conception of 
7 I  return to this  issue,  but in the edited summary of the 1920 Oxford paper that 
formed the basis of ‘Le Possible et le Réel’ Bergson does write (1972: 1324) that if 
something was possible, it was “par avance, plus ou moins vaguement représentable”. 
For contemporary approaches to the issue of conceivability in relation to possibility, 
see King 2010 and Gendler and Hawthorne 2003.
8 According to the now ‘standard’ terminology, physical or nomological possibility is 
a matter of conformity to laws of nature, whereas metaphysical possibility is, more 
generally,  a  matter  of  conformity  to  the  conditions  of  existence  as  such.  In 
contemporary possible world semantics, P is metaphysically possible just in case P 
obtains in some possible world.
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creation.9 Such a sense of possibility is the basis of Leibniz’s idea of 
the  possible  worlds  arrayed  before  the  infinite  understanding  of 
God,  who,  by  virtue  of  his  goodness,  actualises  the  best  among 
them; and, indeed, Bergson later stated that the target of his essay 
was, above all, Leibniz’s doctrine.10 On this account, the possible is 
that which is conceivable without contradiction; a possible world is a 
maximal  collection  of  compossible  things;  and  the  worlds  thus 
possible already exist in the divine intelligence. For Leibniz’s God, 
therefore, the future is wholly foreseeable, and, in a sense, it has 
already ‘happened’, even if His possible worlds are not, as they are 
for  contemporary  modal  realists,  real  spatio-temporal  worlds 
existing somewhere other than this one.
Against these claims, and presuming Leibniz’s God not to exist, 
Bergson asks us to consider the future forms of literature: these are 
just as unforeseeable as was  Hamlet  in the 16th century. There is 
nothing in the present state of art that allows us to determine what 
the original art of the future will be, and it is for this reason, when 
the work is brought about by a person of “talent and genius” [PM 
110], that it is original.  Hamlet  was conceivable and thus possible 
only  when  it  was  written:  “it  is  clear  that  the  person  in  whom 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet came forth in the form of the possible would 
have  created  in  this  way  its  reality;  this  would  have  been,  by 
definition, Shakespeare himself” [PM 113]. If the work of the future 
were already possible, if I could conceive it, “I would”, Bergson says, 
immediately “make it (je la ferais)” [PM 110]. In fact, I would already 
have made it,  for  “as soon as the musician has the precise and 
complete idea of the symphony he will  create, his symphony has 
been created” [PM 13]. This is not to say, however, that Bergson has 
an idealist conception of creation according to which the artist first 
9 See Knuuttila 1982 and Normore 2003.
10 See Benrubi 1942: 366: ‘“J’ai voulu, dit-il, réagir surtout contre Leibniz qui voyait dans le réel la 
réalisation du possible”’.
has an idea of the finished product that she then realises in the work 
material, for as he had already written in 1907: “a free action or a 
work of art […] can be expressed in terms of ideas only after the 
fact and in an approximate manner”.11
To claim that the artwork of the future was not already enclosed 
“in some kind of cupboard of possibles” [PM 110] is not necessarily 
to  claim  that  it  was  impossible.  It  certainly  was  not  logically 
impossible, as is the contradictory idea of a square circle, and there 
was  no  “insurmountable  obstacle”  [PM  112]  preventing  its 
realisation. “This non-impossibility of the thing” can be thought as 
“the condition of its realisation”, Bergson admits. Yet if we use the 
word possible to name such non-impossibility, adopting in this way 
Aristotle’s  most  general  definition  of  possibility,12 we  should 
recognise that  “the possible  thus understood has no virtuality  or 
ideal  pre-existence  (n’est  pas  du  virtuel,  de  l’idéalment  pré-
existant)” [PM 112]. In this sense of possibility, for Bergson, it is a 
truism to claim that possibility is the condition of actuality, whereas 
in  the other,  stronger  sense it  is  a  pure  illusion,  for  it  would  be 
tantamount to claiming that Shakespeare pre-existed Shakespeare 
himself [PM 112].
When  exemplified  in  relation  to  the  history  of  art,  Bergson’s 
argument  may  not  be  particularly  demanding.  If  we  accept  the 
equation  of  possibility  with  conceivability,  then  the  conclusion 
seems inevitable: original works of art, in their irreducible singularity 
and particularity, and thus in their novelty, are not possible before 
they  occur.  What  is  more,  Bergson’s  claims  concerning  both 
possibility and novelty in the production of fine art are by no means 
11 Bergson 1959: 684.
12 See  Aristotle,  Prior  Analytics I,  13  32a18-21.  As  Knuuttila  (1982:  345)  notes 
Aristotle uses this definition outside of strictly logical contexts (e.g. De caelo 281b15-
21). Whether or not Bergson understands this idea of impossibility in a sense more 
physical than mere logical inconsistency is a moot point.
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wholly  novel,  for  Kant,  it  should  be  noted,  seems  to  make 
comparable claims within the analysis of genius in the  Critique of 
Judgment.13 Within  art  in  general,  as  Kant  writes,  what  is  to  be 
produced must first be “represented as possible [als möglich]”14 in 
the producer’s mind, after which the physical process of production 
makes this representation actual. The design and conception of the 
product  occurs  according  to  a  process  of  rational,  conceptual 
deliberation and according to ‘rules’ which can be learnt and applied 
in different cases: in order to produce a table, one must select an 
appropriate material, the table itself must have a certain form etc. 
Fine and original art, in contrast, “does not permit of the judgment 
of the beauty of its product being derived from any rule that has a 
concept for its determining ground, and that depends, consequently, 
on a concept of the way in which the product is possible (wie es 
möglich  sei)”.15 In  short,  fine  art  production,  as  opposed to  craft 
production,  does  not  consist  in  the  actualisation  of  a  pre-given 
conceptual possibility.
Certainly,  in Bergson’s ‘The Possible  and the Real’  there is  no 
positive account of what in the artwork transcends the cold clarity of 
13 References  to  Kant’s  Kritik  der  Urteilskraft follow the  Akademie  edition  with 
volume and page. The translations are those of Walker in the Oxford edition (Kant 
2007).  Bergson does not,  it  seems, refer anywhere explicitly to Kant’s analysis  of 
genius in The Critique of Judgment.
14 Kant V: 307. Note that if possibility here means anything more than mere logical 
possibility, then it is to be thought according to its determination in a narrower and 
more metaphysical sense as ‘real possibility’ within the Critique of Pure Reason: here 
the  concept  of  a  thing  is  possible  “if  it  accords  with  the  formal  conditions  of 
experience in general”. Kant A220/B219. I use the common A/B form here to refer to 
pages of the first and second editions of Kant’s Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. On Kant’s 
early and later or ‘critical’ conceptions of modality, see Hintikka and Kannisto 1981.
15 Both quotations: Kant V 308.
conceptual meaning that could be compared to Kant’s doctrine of 
aesthetic ideas, and in this sense Bergson does not present, here or 
elsewhere, a developed aesthetic theory.16 In fact, rather than offer a 
theory  relating only  to  a  particular  mode of  experience,  Bergson 
aims to  extend his  account  of  artistic  creation  in  relation  to  the 
present and future of our lived experience in general: life is lived as 
a continual work of genius, as the continual irruption of “génialité”,17 
insofar  as there  is  something qualitatively  unique and original  in 
every state of mind, in every moment of phenomenal experience, in 
every action. Early in the first chapter of Creative Evolution Bergson 
was  relatively  explicit  about  the  importance  of  a  conception  of 
genius in his thinking, for he refers to Gabriel Séaille’s Le génie dans 
l’art, which argues that “thought continues life” and that both can 
de described as the work – in differing degrees – of  genius as a 
“creative power (puissance créatrice)”.18 In fact,  after stating that 
“one can say of life, as one can say of consciousness that at every 
moment it  creates something”,  Bergson credits  in  a footnote the 
“double thesis” that “art prolongs nature and that life is creation” to 
Séailles’ book on genius.19
16 For Bergson’s recognition of the lack of a developed aesthetic theory in his work, 
see Benrubi 1942: 368. On this point see also Pilkington 1976: 142.
17 Bergson 1959: 634 : ”Quant à l’invention proprement dite, qui est pourtant le point 
de départ de l’industrie elle-même, notre intelligence n’arrive pas à la saisir dans son 
jaillissement, c’est-à-dire dans ce qu’elle a d’indivisible, ni dans sa génialité, c’est-à-
dire dans ce qu’elle a de créateur”. Arthur Mitchell’s translation of the term (Bergson 
1911: 173) as ‘fervour’ occludes the connection to the idea of genius.
18 Séailles 1883 vii. All translations of this text in the present essay are my own.
19 Bergson 1959: 518-519. Note that in his 1904 discourse on the life and works of 
Félix  Ravaisson (to  whom  Le génie  dans  l’art is  dedicated)  Bergson had  already 
pointed to the unity of art and metaphysics: “Toute la philosophie de M. Ravaisson 
dérive de cette idée que l’art est une métaphysique figurée, que la métaphysique est 
une réflexion sur l’art, et que c’est la même intuition, diversement utilisé, qui fait le 
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I will return to Séailles’ book shortly, but the first illustration in 
‘The Possible and the Real’ of this omnipresent genial novelty, an 
illustration that  Bergson seems to present  without  irony,  may be 
less  than  convincing:  no  matter  how  I  envisage  a  meeting  with 
colleagues  beforehand,  “the  whole  gives  me  a  unique  and  new 
impression, as if it were drawn all in one go by the hand of an artist” 
[PM 99]. Bergson is, however, trying to convey the idea that novelty 
inhabits the most routine experiences, without denying the reality of 
that routine. There are aspects of our own experience and actions, 
he argues, just as there are aspects of original art, which consist of 
rule-bound repetition.  If  the  artist  is  to  produce something other 
than original nonsense, the wings of genius, as we might say, have 
to be clipped by taste, schools and technique; and this technique, 
mere “repetition”, as Bergson notes, “concerns above all what the 
work will have in common with others” [PM 103]. In the same sense, 
in  the  course  of  our  everyday  lives  we  have  every  interest  in 
following rules and regulations, and in contracting habits of effective 
action.  Although  Bergson  often  evaluates  such  habits  and  social 
rules  negatively  as  stifling  creativity,  they  do,  viewed  more 
positively, facilitate and provide a ground for novelty: “there will be 
novelty in our acts only thanks to what we have found to be of a 
repetitive nature in things” [PM 103].20
Bergson evidently extends, in any case, his account of genius, 
and  thus  of  possibility  and  novelty,  from  the  fine  arts  to  life  in 
general,  and  this  extension  is  precisely  what  is  at  stake  in  his 
philosophie profond et le grand artiste” [PM 266].  Keith Ansell-Pearson (2005: 70) 
signals  the importance  of  this  passage and of  Bergson’s  reference  to  the work of 
Séailles,  without,  however,  recognising  how  a  conception  of  genius  determines 
Bergson’s reflection on art and his metaphysics as a whole.
20 These two different evaluations of habit do not alter Bergson’s dualistic conception 
of it as other than, if not directly opposed to, a principle of freedom. On this point, see 
Renault 2004 and Sinclair 2011.
‘metaphysics  of  genius’.  This  extension  does  not  entail  that  the 
meeting next week or my finishing a paper at home instead, are not 
possible.21 Bergson’s position is rather that we have general ideas 
about  such future  contingencies  –  general  ideas  that  are  always 
inadequate to the singularity and particularity of experience – only 
on the basis of past experience, and thus that possibility here does 
not precede the real but rather arises from it. The implicit empiricist 
premise underlying this argument, according to which concepts or 
representations  derive  from  experience,  and  not  from,  say,  the 
productivity of the imagination, is certainly questionable. Yet for our 
purposes it  is  more important to note Bergson’s diagnosis of  the 
ultimate source of the “illusion” that possibility precedes actuality: 
through  a  covert  and illegitimate  form of  pragmatism we import 
ideas “from the domain of fabrication” into “that of creation” [PM 
107]. The idea of prior possibility derives from our prosaic concern 
with  realising  plans  and  goals,  which  can  be  instantiated  many 
times over in different acts or products of the same form. Hence 
when we claim that the possible, i.e. a preconceived idea, precedes 
the real, we apply a schema proper to the domain of fabrication to 
the flux of life in general. In so doing we fail to recognise that these 
pre-conceived ideas are the result of an original act of creation, and 
that  all  of  our  particular  acts  and  experiences  are  intrinsically 
different to those of the past. There is always, Bergson holds, an 
element of creation in our actions, even in those that may seem at 
first glance to be merely a choice between pre-existing options: “If I 
deliberate  before  acting,  the  moments  of  the  deliberation  offer 
themselves to my consciousness as the successive sketches, each 
21 Thus Bergson offers not a negation of possibility, but a “quasi-négation”; Chedin, 
1986: 36. In this sense Bergson’s inquiry is limited to a concern for the origin or 
genesis  of  the  ideas  in  modal  propositions,  and.he  does  not  explicitly  attempt  to 
reduce talk of the possible to talk of the actual, as a present-day ‘combinatorial’ theory 
of possibility might; on the latter, see Armstrong 1989. 
11
particular in its own way, that a painter would draw of his painting; 
and the act itself, in being carried out, may well realise something 
desired and consequently foreseen, but it has nonetheless its own 
original form” [PM 100].
2. Possibility and Potentiality
If the illusion that possibility precedes reality just as a blueprint is 
prior to production is as tenacious as Bergson considers it  to be, 
then the  critique of  possibility  that  he  draws out  according to  a 
conception of genius is salutary. Despite the questionable empiricist 
premise  underlying  the  argument  and  its  lack  of  precision  with 
regard to specific historical doctrines, Bergson’s thinking offers an 
antidote to perhaps pernicious and persistent philosophical illusions. 
Much less salutary, however, is that Bergson seems to consider his 
critique of possibility in this narrow sense as a critique of possibility 
per se. The issue here is not that in the cases of metaphysical and 
physical possibility, conceivability can be only a guide and not a test 
for determining what is possible,  given that some things may be 
conceivable  and  yet  perfectly  unrealisable  in  the  world.  Bergson 
does not, in point of fact, explicitly endorse a conceivability test for 
possibility, and states only – in the 1920 version of the paper – that 
for something to be possible it must be “in advance, more or less 
vaguely representable”.22 The issue, then, is  not the thought that 
conceivability is a sufficient condition for possibility, but rather the 
thought that it is a necessary condition. For according to a paradigm 
of possibility as grounded in powers or potentialities, the fact that 
our preconceptions are inadequate to the novelty of events does not 
entail that those events were not possible before they occurred. The 
particular form of a novel work of art in a block of marble may well 
have been unforeseeable, but we can still argue that the stone was 
22 Bergson 1972: 1324.
the statue in potentia, that the powers of the stone, along with the 
capacities of the artist,  are what made the statue possible. We can 
certainly admit with Bergson that  conceptions of  what something 
can  possibly  be  arrive  after  the  fact,  in  the  event,  but  this 
epistemological  delay  by  no  means  necessarily  entails  the  non-
existence of prior possibility as potentiality.23
Bergson’s critique of  prior  possibility,  then, applies only  to a 
particular,  intellectualist  conception  of  possibility.  Of  course,  one 
might imagine that elsewhere, in order to dispense with all forms of 
modal thinking, Bergson criticises and rejects any metaphysics of 
powers or potentialities – but he does not. On the contrary, many of 
his ideas concerning time as duration – such as the evolution of life 
as the progressive realisation of the  élan vital  in 1907 – seem to 
develop or at least require some sort of metaphysics of powers. In 
this  connection,  Pete  Gunter  has  recently  claimed   that  the 
arguments in ‘The Possible and the Real’ should not be “taken at 
face  value”,  and  that  Bergson’s  approach  presupposes  a  more 
positive conception of possibility. For “it would seem to follow” from 
Bergson’s argument “that there exists no inherent relation between 
the past and present”24, whereas in all of his major works Bergson 
had affirmed, in different ways, that duration involves precisely such 
a relation.  It  should be underlined,  however,  that in and of  itself 
Bergson’s  critique  of  possibility  concludes  only  that  there  is  no 
relation between the present and the future that is conceivable in 
advance, and not that there is no relation between them at all. It is 
23 For  a  defence  of  Aristotle’s  conception  of  the  possible  as  potentiality  against 
Bergson’s critique, see Chedin 1986. Chedin’s arguments serve to challenge (although 
he does not refer to them) Hannah Arendt’s assumption that Bergson’s account of 
possibility is automatically a compelling critique of ideas of potentiality; see Arendt 
1978: 31.
24 All three quotations: Gunter 2007: 34.
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only his accompanying affirmations concerning novelty in the essay 
that constitute, in effect, such a denial.
Indeed,  when  Bergson  articulates  an  early  version  of  his 
argument concerning possibility in the footnote of the first chapter 
of Creative Evolution that refers to Le génie dans l’art, he in no way 
contradicts  Séailles’  basic  thesis  that  art “does  not  break  the 
continuity of spiritual phenomena”.25 Séailles had emphasised that 
the genius borrows the ‘elements’ of her work from experience of 
the world and from history; originality does not emerge ex nihilo and 
is already involved in the artist’s selective perception and historical 
awareness.26 Bergson certainly qualifies this position, but he denies 
only that creation is a synthesis of pre-existing, separable elements, 
for this would be to admit that “their synthesis would have been 
given virtually, being merely one of its possible arrangements”, and 
that a superhuman intelligence would have been able to apprehend 
this  synthesis  “in  advance”.  At  least  in  the  domain  of  life,  the 
‘elements’ – and Bergson is so far from denying an inheritance from 
the past in the present that he finds it possible to continue to use 
the  term  in  a  positive  sense  –  “have  no  real  and  separate 
existence”.27
It is not simply the case, however, that in 1934 Bergson attaches 
affirmations of  novelty  to his  treatment of  possibility,  whereas in 
1907 he had not. The issue is rather that the idea of novelty can 
take on different accents in his work. On the one hand, novelty in an 
epistemological sense means only unforseeability,  which does not 
preclude  an  intrinsic  relation  of  past  and  present.  This  sense  of 
novelty –  which seems to predominate in Bergson’s earlier work, 
25 Séailles 1883 152.
26 See  Chapter  V of  Séailles  1883  for  his  argument  concerning  the  pre-existing 
elements appropriated by genius.
27 Bergson 1959: 518-519.
particularly  when  he  is  discussing  biological  evolution  –  is 
compatible  with  ‘maturation’.28 On  this  basis,  ‘creation’  as  the 
principle of the production of novelty can be understood such that 
the idea of a ‘creative evolution’ is not a contradiction in terms. Yet, 
on  the other  hand,  epistemological  novelty  often gives  way to a 
more ‘radical’ or ‘absolute’ sense of novelty, one implying complete 
discontinuity of the present with the past. This comes to the fore in 
Bergson’s discussion of artistic – as opposed to natural – production, 
and particularly in ‘The Possible and the Real’.29 In this way, creation 
– in a historically proper sense – means production of an absolute 
novelty, and thus production  ex nihilo.30 Certainly, some caution is 
required here, for Bergson argues that nothingness, like possibility 
and like disorder, is a mere en rationis supervenient on reality.31 Yet 
insofar  as  he  holds  –  as  we  will  see  more  clearly  below  –  that 
creation results from a position transcendent to time and history it is 
radically  de novo,  and thus  ex nihilo  in the sense that it emerges 
from no existent thing other than the creative subject herself.32 It is 
true to say, as Stallknecht put it in an important study of 1934, that 
28 See Bergson 1959: 503, a passage that I discuss in the following note.
29 Bergson does  not  himself  adequately clarify the  difference  between these  two 
senses of novelty, and they are both present already in 1907. In L’évolution créatrice  
(Bergson 1959: 503), immediately after having stating that  durée means “invention, 
création de formes, élaboration continue de l’absolument nouveau”, Bergson writes of 
“un travail intérieur de maturation ou de création”, as if maturation and creation were 
synonymous.
30 We should recall that in the Renaissance  creatio  and  creare were still only very 
rarely used to describe human, in contrast to divine production, and that the usage 
became common in the 17th and 18th centuries within the same movement of thought 
that led ‘genius’ to be posited as an irrational talent of the fine artist; on this history 
see Zilsel 1972 and Nahm 1947.
31 Bergson rehearses these arguments at the beginning of ‘Le possible et le réel’.
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“Bergson’s  philosophy really  contains  two accounts  of  creation”33, 
and  yet  it  is  unhelpful  to  name  these  the  ‘irrational’  and  the 
‘esthetic’. For the ‘irrational’ idea of the production of an absolute 
novelty is already ‘esthetic’ insofar as it is influenced by a particular 
– and theologically inspired – interpretation of fine art production 
that came to the fore in the 17th and 18th centuries.
It was, it would appear, precisely in order to account for the 
first,  less  radical  sense  of  novelty  and  creation  that  seems  to 
predominate  in  Bergson’s  earlier  work  that  in  1930/31  Vladimir 
Jankélévitch argued that his thinking presupposes an unspoken idea 
of “organic possibility (possibilité organique)”.  Organic possibility is 
that  from  which  the  present  event  emerges,  and  it  is  to  be 
distinguished  from  mere  logical  possibility  as  a  “promise”  is 
distinguished from “permission”.34 As  a  promise,  it  is  “an  élan  or 
drive towards the concrete”, and yet “a mystical indetermination, 
rich, profound and sonorous like the silence of the night”.35 It is not a 
set  of  distinct  ‘possibles’,  ghostly  proto-things  striving  to  be 
actualised, but a primal state of interpenetration from which beings 
emerge  in  the  forward  thrust  of  life.  Organic  possibility,  on  this 
account, is in one sense nothing; it is “nothing at present, but it will 
be”.  In  another  sense,  however,  it  is  not  a  pure  nothing;  “it  is 
something,  but  it  represents  in  a compressed state an existence 
that  in  its  adulthood  will  blossom  freely”.  For  Jankélévitch,  this 
organic  possibility  characterises  all  those  “nascent  states  that 
Bergson excels in describing”,36 and it accords with Bergson’s basic 
32 For this terminological distinction between ex nihilo and de novo, see Mullarkey 
1999: 137.
33 Stallknecht 1934: 53.
34 Jankélévitch, 1959: 217. All translations from this text are my own.
35 Jankélévitch, 1959: 218.
36 All three quotations: Jankélévitch, 1959: 217.
idea that  in  ‘creative’  processes new forms emerge by means of 
dissociation  and  division,  and  not  through  any  process  of 
rearrangement of already distinct elements.
It should be noted, however, that Bergson had already read the 
manuscript of Jankélévitch’s book before having his essay translated 
into Swedish in 1930.37 Despite the warm, congratulatory letter he 
sent to Jankélévitch, it may seem, therefore, that Bergson did not 
think  the  claims  concerning  ‘organic  possibility’  worthy  of 
development. This context may also seem to justify the approach of 
another important study, namely Gilles Deleuze’s  Le bergsonisme. 
Given Bergson’s apparent antipathy to any conception of possibility, 
perhaps the only  option  available  to  us  in  order  to  preserve the 
integrity  of  his  thinking  as  a  whole  is  to  attempt  to  establish  a 
distinction  between  the  possible,  including  any  ideas  of  organic 
possibility or potentiality, and the virtual. The two terms ‘possible’ 
and ‘virtual’, which are traditionally synonymous or at least closely 
related, are now to be deliberately distinguished.38 The realisation of 
possibility  or  even  potentiality,  Deleuze  claims,  involves 
reproduction of possibles that are somehow pre-existent, and thus 
marginalisation  of  un-realised possibles;  the virtual,  on  the  other 
37 See Jankélévitch 1959: 2. Bergson’s letter to Jankélévitch is available in Bergson 
1972: 1495. Pete Gunter (2007: 35) does not recognise this – inconvenient – historical 
fact when he appeals to Jankélévitch’s arguments concerning ‘organic possibility’ in 
order to address the problems posed by Bergson’s critique.
38 On this  traditional  synonymy see  Lalande 1988 [1926]:  1211:  “d’une manière 
générale, est  virtuel  ce qui n’existe qu’en puissance et non en acte ; mais cela peut 
s’entendre en deux sens :  A – Au sens faible :  qui est  simplement  possible  en un 
certain  sujet  (comme  le  bloc  de  marbre  qui  est  ‘dieu,  table  ou  cuvette’).  Cette 
acception est rare. […] B – Au sens fort :  qui est déjà prédéterminé, quoique cela 
n’apparaisse pas au dehors,  et  qui contient toutes les conditions essentielles à son 
actualisation”.
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hand,  must  create  its  own  lines  of  actualisation  in  positive  and 
genuinely novel acts.39 Note, however, that although the essence of 
the argument is Bergsonian, the terminology is not: within the 1934 
essay,  as  we  have  seen,  Bergson  uses  the  word  virtuel,  in  a 
perfectly traditional  way, as a synonym of  possible.40 To construe 
Bergson as a philosopher of the virtual, as opposed to a philosopher 
of potentiality or possibility, is not only to interpret a philosopher as 
saying what he does not say, but also to read that philosopher as 
saying the opposite of what, in ‘The Possible and the Real’, he does 
actually say.
3. The Retroactivity of the Possible
The  difference  between  the  interpretations  of  Jankélévitch  and 
Deleuze is to some extent merely terminological, since both seem to 
accept the necessity – in order to understand Bergson’s own work – 
of providing a more positive account of modality than the critique of 
prior possibility in ‘The Possible and the Real’. To say that the issue 
is terminological, however, is not to say this terminological choice is 
unimportant,  for opposing the ‘virtual’  to  the ‘possible’,  as if  the 
meaning of  the latter  were perfectly  univocal,  risks  alienating us 
from the philosophical tradition. Moreover, it risks blinding us to the 
positive conception of possibility that Bergson does, in fact, advance 
in the essay. Already in the version of the paper delivered in Oxford 
39 Deleuze 1966: 100.
40 Both  examples:  PM 112.  Deleuze’s  sleight  of  hand  on  this  synonymy in  ‘Le 
possible et le réel’ usually goes unnoticed amidst the contemporary enthusiasm for 
Bergson as a thinker of the ‘virtual’. See Moore 2012:411-418 for a recent example of 
this. John Mullarkey, however, does note that Bergson often uses the term virtual as a 
synonym of the “illusory possible” (Mullarkey 2004: 483) and thus that “no clear 
water  exists  in  Bergson’s  texts  between the virtual  and the  possible  as  it  does  in 
Deleuze’s reading” (Mullarkey 2004: 492). On this point, see also Chedin 1986: 38.
in  1920,41 Bergson  argues  that  although it  is  nothing  at  present, 
possibility nevertheless will be. Although the event was not possible 
before it happened, it will have been possible once it has happened. 
The idea of the possible is therefore admissible if we accept that the 
possible is not a kind of presence, but rather a certain kind of future 
anteriority. We might ordinarily think that a present that becomes 
past becomes a necessity, because now we can do nothing about it, 
but  here Bergson claims that  the past  is  the realm of  possibility 
insofar as the present puts it there. He recounts a conversation with 
a journalist:
‘Let a man of talent or genius come forth, let him create a work: it will then 
be real, and by that very fact it becomes retrospectively or retroactively 
possible. It would not be possible, it would not have been so, if this man 
had not come upon the scene. That is why I tell you that it will have been 
possible today, but that is not yet so.’ […] ‘That one can insert the real 
into  the  past  and  thus  operate  backwards  in  time,  this  I  have  never 
proposed. But there is no doubt that the possible can be lodged in it, or 
rather that the possible comes to lodge itself in it…’ [PM 111].
Although  Nietzsche  had  already  articulated  an  idea  of  the 
retroactivity of the present on the past, Bergson’s brief remarks on 
this point are certainly new in the sense that nothing in his earlier 
reflections on time explicitly prepares us for them.42 Yet the remarks 
41 See  Bergson  1972:1322-26.  Of  the  commentators  already  mentioned,  only 
Jankélévitch considers Bergson’s doctrine of retroactivity to be worthy of extended 
discussion. However, even though Jankélévitch claims that Bergson developed this 
doctrine in response to reading his manuscript in 1930 (Jankélévitch 1959: 2), he does 
not address the problems – which I delineate below – attendant on the doctrine itself.
42 See  Friedrich  Nietzsche  III:  404  (references  to  Nietzsche’s  work  follow  the 
Kritische Studienausgabe with volume and page): “Historia abscondita. – Jede grosse 
Mensch hat eine rückwirkende Kraft; alle Geschichte wird um seinetwillen wieder auf 
die  Wage gestellt,  und tausend Geheimnisse der Vergangenheit  kriechen aus  ihren 
Schlupfwinkeln – hinein in seine Sonne. Es ist gar nicht abzusehen, was Alles einmal 
noch Geschichte sein wird. Die Vergangenheit ist veilleicht immer noch wesentlich 
19
amount to much more than a fleeting observation, since the idea of 
retroactivity  is  developed  in  the  introduction  to  La  pensée  et  le 
mouvant, the volume in which ‘Le Possible et le Réel’ first appeared.
Here Bergson illuminates the idea with another example from the 
history of literature. Classicism offers itself now as a precursor of the 
romanticism of  “a  Rousseau,  a  Chateaubriand,  a  Vigny”,  but  the 
“romantic  aspect  of  classicism  emerged  only  by  the  retroactive 
effect of romanticism once it appeared” [PM 16]. This aspect did not 
exist before romanticism, but, “retroactively”, the latter “created its 
own pre-figuration in  the past and an explanation of  itself  by its 
predecessors”  [PM  16].  Romanticism,  that  is,  created  its  own 
precursors.43 A novel work of art or literature allows us to view the 
tradition in a different way, and it  is  for this  reason that original 
artists  and  writers,  some  time  after  the  ‘shock  of  the  new’  has 
receded,  find  themselves  faced with  accusations  that  their  ideas 
were already there, like fruit ready to be picked, within the tradition. 
These accusations are expressions of what Bergson now terms the 
“retrograde movement of truth” [PM 1] insofar as they presuppose 
that the novel element was there all along and that, if anything has 
changed at  all,  it  is  merely  our  view  of  things.  This  is,  Bergson 
claims, a “natural tendency” of the human mind that is no less an 
“error” and an “illusion”, the “mirage of the present in the past” [PM 
15].
unentdeckt! Es bedarf noch so veieler rückwirkender Kräfte!”.
43 Bergson is referring to E. Deschanel’s Le Romantisme des Classiques (Deschanel 
1882), as Robinet points out in Bergson 1959: 1574. As Jorge Luis Borges will write 
(and I  am indebted to  William Large for this  reference)  in  1951, referring not to 
Bergson but to a 1941 essay by T. S. Eliot: “The fact is that every writer creates his 
own precursors. His work modifies our conception of the past, as it will modify the 
future” (Borges 1964: 201). This is to say that all creative art and writing, as Pierre 
Bayard has put it, is Le Plagiat par anticipation (Bayard 2009).
This  illusory  retrograde  movement,  then,  accompanies  the 
retroactive operation of the present on the past insofar as we think 
that  an  original  work  of  art  was  possible,  not  just  after  it  has 
occurred, but before it  occurred. It  is  crucial to remark, however, 
that  now  Bergson  thinks  possibility  –  however  inchoately  –  in  a 
sense  that  goes  beyond  conceivability  without  contradiction. 
Although,  after  the fact  of  romanticism, it  is  true that  classicism 
made romanticism possible, Bergson does not want to claim that 
now it is true that classical authors already  had in mind, or could 
have had in mind, what is essential to romantic literature. Instead, 
possibility now seems to be thought as a quality of real, historical 
things,  of  works  of  art  themselves:44 in  classicism,  romanticism 
makes present  “a  certain  aspect”  or  “slice (découpure)”  [PM  16] 
that did not previously exist, and which constitutes the possibility of 
romanticism itself. Possibility is no longer ‘ideal pre-existence’, but 
rather the future anteriority of a certain reality. In this way, however, 
Bergson risks conflating actuality with possibility. For it is not simply 
the  possibility  of  romanticism  that  romanticism  creates  in 
classicism.  This  is  certainly  true  in  a  sense,  but  in  creatively 
deforming  history,  romanticism  makes  new  aspects  visible,  i.e. 
actual in the extant works of classicism. That is, the original artwork 
produces  its  ‘actual’  precursors  and  not  its  possible  ones.  The 
44 It is according to this idea of the retroactivity of the possible that Bergson seems to 
move from an essentially logical conception of possibility as non-contradiction to a 
more physical or metaphysical – and still less clearly defined – sense of possibility. As 
Mullarkey has it, Bergson conflates “logical possibility with metaphysical possibility” 
(Mullarkey 1999: 173), particularly in his discussion of the colour orange not being 
composed of yellow and red in a world where there exists, as of yet, only the colour 
orange.  Once the  composition has  been discovered,  our  “habitual  logic”,  Bergson 
claims, “cannot prevent itself projecting into the past, as possibilities or virtualities, 
present realities” [PM 19]. Yet the possibilities in this instance are not thoughts, but 
rather realities, i.e. red and yellow previously existing.
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romantic  slices  or  aspects  of  classicism  made  present  by 
romanticism are not just possible but well and truly actual. It now 
seems, in the introduction to the volume that Bergson wrote after 
‘The  Possible  and  the  Real’,  that  he  no  longer  considers  it 
extravagant, as he did in the essay, to claim that the real can be 
inserted into the extant works of the past.
Another issue follows from this. On the one hand, Bergson seems 
to  maintain  that  the  new  aspect  revealed  in  classicism  by 
romanticism did not previously exist in any sense at all, even though 
he advances the idea with a verb in the conditional:  the aspects 
“could be additions of new qualities, created from scratch (de toutes 
pièces) and absolutely unforeseeable; and consequently an aspect 
(côté) of the present exists as an ‘aspect’ only when our attention 
has isolated it” [PM 15]. On the other hand, if Bergson really does 
think these aspects are created ‘from scratch’, one wonders why he 
uses the verb isoler in the last sentence, and then both a reflexive 
verb in a passive sense, se dégager, and a noun,  découpure, with 
privative prefixes to describe the action of the present on the past: 
the découpure or ‘cutting’  s’est dégagé, was revealed in, or “lifted 
out of” as Andison has it, classicism by romanticism.45 Bergson could 
have phrased the matter quite differently, using different words to 
express an idea of the present simply putting something in the past, 
or imposing something on it.  The fact that he does not could be 
taken as a residual expression of the retrospective illusion that he 
otherwise  criticises.  Yet  it  seems  that  this  is  much  rather  an 
expression  of  the  difficulties  of  his  own  ‘creationist’  position.  He 
considers  explicitly  only  two  alternatives:  either  the  aspect  was 
already and actually there in the work of the past or it is created in it 
45 See Bergson 1949: 23 and PM 15-16. In the new critical edition of La pensée et le  
mouvant,  Arnaud François (Bergson 2009: 314) feels it necessary to underline that 
these  ‘découpures’ are  in  fact  created,  but  he  passes  over  in  silence  the  tensions 
involved in such a claim and does not clarify the sense of creation itself.
by the work of the present. Yet Bergson’s own apparent hesitations 
indicate that the latter conception is hardly convincing enough to 
combat the allegedly illusory attractions of the former.
Bergson’s official doctrine, then, seems to be that the new aspect 
is imposed on the tradition and that it is thus created ‘from scratch’. 
It is instructive to note that in this way Bergson has – consciously or 
otherwise  –  come  to  reject,  rather  than  merely  qualify,  Séailles’ 
thinking in  Le génie dans l’art.  According to his continuity thesis, 
Séailles had claimed that “the imagination” – genius, in other words 
–  “does  not  create,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word;  it  does  not 
produce  new forms  from scratch  (créées  de  toutes  pièces)”.46 In 
taking up this phrase within his reflection on retroactivity, Bergson 
seems  to  affirm,  pace  Séailles,  the  absolute  spontaneity  and 
creative power of the artist, at least as a hypothesis: not only has 
the artist the ability to produce new forms in the present, she also 
has the power to create them in the works of the past.
A third issue in Bergson’s conception of retroactivity concerns 
the extension of his ‘creationist’ doctrine – in Séailles’ strict sense of 
the term ‘creation’ – in the theory of art to the movement of history 
in general. The idea of fine art as the product of an unconditioned 
genial subject is now, after a few centuries, a commonplace, but the 
extension  of  this  idea  –  within  what  I  have  called  Bergson’s 
‘metaphysics  of  genius’  –  to  social  development  more  broadly 
understood is much more challenging. Bergson writes that nothing 
in the present state of society allows us to understand what it will 
become, and that the precursory signs of the future in the present 
will become retroactively apparent only when that future has arrived 
[PM 17].47 It seems difficult to consider this picture of history without 
46 Séailles 1883: 154.
47“The premonitory signs are therefore, in our eyes, signs only because we know the 
course, because the course has been completed. Neither the course, nor its direction, 
nor in consequence, its end were given when these facts came into being: hence they 
were  not  yet  signs”  [PM 15].  The  political  consequences  of  such  a  doctrine  of 
23
movements, tendencies or social  forces as anything other than a 
description of societal evolution as perpetual revolution. Bergson’s 
critique of possibility certainly derives from his concern in L’essai to 
overturn conceptions of freedom as the operation of a libre arbitre 
selecting  from a-temporal  possibles.  Yet,  on  the  evidence  of  his 
treatment of social history here, the principle of human action and 
freedom is  itself  extra-historical.  To be sure,  Bergson admits in a 
parenthesis  that  “not  just  any (non quelconque)”  [PM  15]  novel 
reality is able to emerge from a specific point in history. Yet this only 
gives rise to the question of the nature of the ‘link’ between the past 
and future, and of what there is in the past that allows only certain 
forms of the future. In other words, Bergson does not explain why 
the idea that nothing is possible before it happens does not amount 
to the claim that everything is, in the end, possible.
Finally, whether it concerns a retroactivity of the possible or of 
the actual,  and whether it  concerns an imposition on or rather a 
revelation of works of the past, the general idea of the retroactive 
action of the present on the past remains as a mere affirmation in 
Bergson’s  work.  In  response  to  the  claim  that  the  possibility  of 
romanticism always resided in classicism, and that  previously  we 
were just unaware of that fact, Bergson, in the end, only exclaims, 
and can only exclaim, that the possibility, i.e. an actual aspect, was 
put there by romanticism. The problem here is not simply the lack of 
a  positive  account  elsewhere  in  Bergson’s  work  of  how  such 
retroactivity might operate. Just as important is the fact that this 
conception of retroactivity contrasts with the idea of ‘pure memory’ 
historical action without conditions are clear: it would lead either to a quietism, since 
radical change will happen regardless of what we do, or to a voluntaristic ‘putchism’ 
that attempts to achieve change without regard to present social conditions. Whether, 
and the extent to which, this conception of history and novelty informs later French 
philosophies of history and of the ‘event’ is not an issue that it is possible to address 
adequately here.
advanced in Matter and Memory. There Bergson had argued that the 
past is a kind of reservoir existing in-itself that is made present – in 
different ways and to different degrees – in experience by means of 
perception,  recognition,  explicit  recollection and dreams. Now the 
claim is – in thinking about the past from the perspective of social, 
cultural  and collective history,  rather than from that of  individual 
memory  –  that  in  some  sense  the  very  nature  of  the  past  is  a 
function of the ‘creativity’ of the present open to the future.
4. Conclusions: Genius and the Will
Bergson’s philosophy of duration, as we have seen, requires a more 
positive conception of modality than the critique of prior possibility 
involved in his inheritance of a concept of genius. This has not gone 
wholly  unnoticed  by  commentators,  and  both  Jankélévitch  and 
Deleuze have attempted, in different ways, to articulate a positive 
modal thinking that would accord with Bergson’s ideas. Within his 
discussion of retroactivity, however, the idea of possibility indeed 
takes  on  a  positive  and  a  more  physical  or  metaphysical  sense, 
insofar as it is no longer simply a function of what can be thought, 
but of a certain quality of real, historical things themselves. On this 
sense of possibility, Bergson’s ‘official’ position is that it is created in 
the past by the work of the present – and yet he also seems drawn 
to the idea that it preceded the present work, but not, to be sure, as 
an ideal possible. Bergson seems drawn, in other words, to the idea 
that  possibility  in this  non-ideal  sense is  neither  simply prior  nor 
simply  posterior  to  the  present,  but  somehow both  at  the  same 
time.
How to make sense of such a position? It implies, of course, that 
the  past  is  integral  to  the  creative  process.  Furthermore,  and to 
remain with the paradigm of artistic creation, it seems to imply that 
canonical  succession  is  constituted  by  a  reciprocal  play  between 
present-day  genius  and  the  exemplarity  of  past  works.  This 
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exemplarity  would  certainly  be  determined  by  the  genius  who 
selects the work as a model, but that canonical work would at the 
same time have to inspire this repetition. Hence the genius and the 
exemplary work are essentially related; the one is nothing without 
the other.  The original  work in  the present  thus emerges not  ex 
nihilo,  but  rather  ex historia,  and yet  this  is  not  to say that  the 
possibility of the original work simply pre-existed the present in the 
great work of the past.  Bergson seems to point towards the idea 
that the original work reveals what the past made possible –  and 
that  this  possibility  is  nothing  without  the  original  work  in  the 
present. On this basis, it would be fruitless to wonder whether the 
possibility of the work chronologically precedes its actuality or vice 
versa, for both arrive together and co-constitute the ‘shock of the 
new’.
If Bergson’s thinking does point in this direction, his later work 
would stand in a hitherto unnoticed proximity to the ‘hermeneutic’ 
conceptions of possibility, temporality and history advanced in the 
20th century  by  Martin  Heidegger  amongst  others.48 Yet  Bergson 
never comes to reflect on a form of historical repetition that would 
be something other than the ‘mere’ repetition, the ‘boring’ (if not 
necessarily ‘bad’) repetition of the same that he describes in ‘The 
Possible and the Real’. This is a function of his attachment to an 
idea of  radical and absolute novelty, an attachment which, to be 
sure, is both epistemologically and ontologically problematic. If the 
present  is  as  radically  or  absolutely  new as  Bergson claims,  one 
wonders how we could recognise it to be so, particularly given that – 
as he had argued in 1896 – memory, and thus the past, conditions 
re-cognition  and  perception  in  general.49 Furthermore,  such  a 
radically new present would reduce the movement of time to a mere 
succession of disconnected moments, and it thus would return us to 
48 See Heidegger 1984.
49 On this point see Mullarkey 1999: 135-137.
the  sort  of  ‘cinematic’  conception  of  movement  that  Bergson 
criticises so compellingly in 1907.50
Bergson is certainly led to an idea of novel discontinuity through 
his inheritance of a modern conception of fine art production as the 
work of  genius,  and, in  the end, he seems unmoved by Séailles’ 
attempt to perceive in genius a principle continuous with nature and 
history. It is necessary to ask, in conclusion, why this is so. The final 
paragraphs  of  ‘The  Possible  and  the  Real’  adduces  three 
distinguishable  but  connected  ethical  motivations  for  Bergson’s 
positing of radical novelty. First, Bergson suggests that a doctrine of 
novelty can guide a way of life from which we can gain “greater joy” 
[PM 116]. Recognising the novelty in experience, he argues, would 
allow us to break the spell of the monotonous repetition of the same 
dulling our sensibility,  and thus it  would allow those who do not 
have easy access to original art to share in the joy of those who do. 
Now, if  novelty is a source of  joy,  then one can understand why 
Bergson might seek its purest form in asserting the existence of a 
present absolutely and radically new. It  is, however, certainly not 
unreasonable to wonder whether such an assertion of  novelty  as 
good  per se ultimately amounts to an absurd ethical prescription, 
one that is interesting only to those, without a fixed purpose in life, 
suffering from ennui.51 Bergson seems not to have considered that 
50 See Chedin 1986: 48.
51 Bergson’s remarks about novelty here confirm the suspicions that Stace (1939: 
296-297)  voiced  in  1939  within  an  attempt  to  clarify  the  “vague  fog  of  ideas 
connected with the concept of novelty as that concept is found in the writings of such 
authors as Bergson, William James, Samuel Alexander”: “I cannot rid my mind of the 
impression  that  these  philosophers  vaguely  and  absurdly  suppose  that  novelty  is 
something  per se  desirable. Is it possible that they are influenced by that thirst for 
change for its  own sake,  for excitement,  for  thrills  and surprises,  which is  apt  to 
consume men who have no serious purpose in their lives, men who in consequence 
suffer from ennui?”.
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different evaluations of  novelty are possible,  or to have read the 
rather  more  negative  one  advanced  in  Søren  Kierkegaard’s 
Repetition:  “Who  could  want  to  be  susceptible  to  every  fleeting 
thing, the novel, which always enervatingly diverts the soul anew?”52
A  second,  more  philosophically  defensible  motivation  for 
Bergson’s attachment to an idea of radical novelty lies in the fact 
that  he  is,  of  course,  a  philosophical  libertarian.  The  error  of 
traditional  philosophies  of  freedom,  he  claims  at  the  end  of  the 
essay, is to have thought it in terms of pre-existing possibilities, for 
to do so is to let the necessitarian enemy through the gates [PM 
115].  Bergson  clearly  has  Leibniz’s  philosophy  in  mind  here: 
Leibniz’s appeal to possibilities – possibilities pre-determined in the 
divine intelligence – does not allow him to escape the necessitarian 
position that he finds in Spinoza.53 Now, we may certainly wish to 
question the specific form of Bergson’s libertarianism, but is clear 
that a conception of ‘absolute’ novelty, of an absolute break from 
the past, makes philosophical room for it.
A  third  motivation  for  his  emphasis  on  radical  novelty  is 
announced in the last lines of the essay: apprehension of novelty in 
our  actions  and  experience  in  general  will  “above  all”  make  us 
“stronger  (plus  fort)”,  “for  we  shall  feel  we  are  participating, 
creators  of  ourselves,  in  the  great  work  of  creation  which  is  the 
origin of all things and which goes on before our eyes” [PM 116]. We 
will gain strength, Bergson argues, in recognising that our creative 
power is one with a more general creative power that underlies life 
and the movement of time as such. Hence: “humbled heretofore in 
an  attitude  of  obedience,  slaves  of  certain  vaguely-felt  natural 
necessities,  we  shall  once  more  stand  erect,  masters  associated 
with  a  great  Master”  [PM  116].  However,  we  are  to  understand 
exactly  this  invocation  of  a  great  Master  in  the  penultimate 
52 Kierkegaard 1983: 133.
53 For a classic statement of this interpretation see Chapter V of Lovejoy 1964.
sentence of the essay, the goal of philosophical reflection and life 
itself is strength and mastery, as Descartes had already held, even if 
we can never gain a monopoly on this power. Consequently, with 
mastery  posited  as  an  ethical  goal,  and  if  creative  novelty  is  a 
function of our own mastery, we can see why Bergson would posit a 
radical form of the former, for this heralds an increase in the scope 
of the latter.
Joy, freedom and mastery – and of the three, Bergson holds the 
third to be the most significant. The reason for this lies, perhaps, in 
the fact that Bergson’s position is the expression not just of a will to 
mastery, but of a philosophy of the will tout court. For Bergson, art 
is the expression of a creative power that is not only extra-historical 
and purely subjective, but also voluntary. We are artistic when “we 
want to be (quand nous le voulons)” [PM 102], he writes, and this is 
not an inadvertent remark given that, as he claims in 1907, “the 
principle of all life” is “a pure willing (un pur vouloir)”.54 If all creation 
is a willing, and all creation – as we have just seen Bergson assert – 
is  a self-creation then all  creation is at bottom a ‘will  to will’  – a 
willing that seeks, by means of its ‘creative expressions’, to increase 
its own power and mastery. We may certainly be able to find similar 
ideas in other thinkers of the 19th and 20th centuries, with Nietzsche 
foremost among them, but it is remarkable – and seldom remarked – 
that  in  Bergson’s  thinking  a  philosophical  voluntarism  comes  to 
occupy the void left by his rejection of the continuity of genius with 
history and nature.
54 Bergson 1959: 697. That the remark in ‘Le possible et le réel’ is not inadvertent is 
noted by Bouaniche in Bergson 2009: 385. On the question of the will in Bergson’s 
thought, see François 2008.
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